Publication

DEBNATH DAS

(Formerly General Secretary, Indian Independence League Hend Quarters East Asia and Member, Council of Ministers, Azad Hind Government).

HISTORY bears indelible imprints of acts of faith and trust, that remain ever bright, fruitful and dynamic; the climate wherein mistrust and lack of conviction infiltrates and pollutes remains dim and unproductive. The chapters that are created under this unhealthy climate dim insignificant in the history of march of people whereas those that are born of faith in Man and God remain forever phenomenal in history. So this act of faith once more helped Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in raising his moral and political stature in not submitting to Japanese pressure and arrogance vis-a-vis the setting up of an Indo-Japanese War Co. Operation Council to function in liberated areas and in deciding fundamentals to India’s favour.

The call of Netaji for total mobilisation in East and South east Asia found a tremendous echo into the minds of the three million Indians because they found in him a pillar of Indian manhood, courage and conviction and an image of honesty and sacrifice. Now, when the Liberation Forces were to establish and consolidate bases in Liberated Areas, the only compelling thought that naturally Netaji’s mind was that such bases must bear an unblemished record of healthy nationalism, robust patriotism, modest yet determined conduct and last but not the least an uncompromising mood for total sacrifice of men and women of India through armed revolution, reflecting the real image of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind. It was a tremendous trial of Netaji’s patriotic fervour, statemanship, intimate sense of history on India’s struggles for Freedom, Himalayan patience, keen strategic sense and logical move, and unassailable tact in his pragmatic approach to all problems that were not only delicate in nature but also extremely difficult to solve. Anything derogatory to the dignity, integrity and sovereignty of Free India was against the very being of Netaji. But, war is war. To win the war becomes the war aim and every-thing however noble, is of secondary value. Philosophy and sentiments do not bother those who handle military machine especially at a time when both sides strong and powerful, stand, face to face to onslaught each other. Military expediency then reigns supreme to decide the clear and compelling purpose of military strategist. The situation becomes more intricate when a dependent country throws herself in military alliance with the powerful enemy of her enemy lodged deeply and strongly in its soil, for the political emancipation of her people. And most intricate the political strategy becomes when the country to be liberated is a great country with a great past having to her credit a glorious history in struggles for freedom in her own way within and that too under the leadership of the greatest man of the age, that is, India.

It is therefore, not the consideration of military triumph alone that was the moot point in discussion with the Japanese Military Command but as every detail involved in total Mobilisation of men, money and materials was scrupulously attended to buy Netaji due to his innate faith in Indians by way of exhorting his compatriots to shoulder the sacred task. Netaji was equally emphatic and keen on the question of independence and integrity in role I.N.A.’s Advance Force and in governance of Liberated Areas. All discussions therefore with the Japanese civil or military, were held in that context. Temporary military gains were not necessarily all important values to Netaji until and unless Netaji was convinced that such gains would appear commensurate with the ideals of Independence Movement in India itself. How it will act and react psycho logically in the minds of the Indian people in general and to what extent such gains would have impact on morals on the political stream of thoughts in minds of men and women in motherland in general was Netaji’s concern. What was the image of India, then.

Following the Quit India’ resolution led by Mahatma Gandhi India entered the final phase of her struggle. Its impact on the use of India’s man power and resources by Britain was not so impressive and effective, viewed from practical point of view in so far as Britain’s war machine in India was concerned. But it was symbolic of India’s stand. All national leaders were incarcerated and hundreds of thousands were within prison walls. Revolutionaries were more active and inflicted great damage on enemy’s war efforts, But all in all, cumulative effect of national struggles could not call a halt to Britain’s stream-roller in exploiting India’s men, money and materials, for her imperialistic end. Britain could also succeed in increasing a sense of hatred and horror against Japanese imperialism and Nazi fascism with all their brutalities and nakedness that appeared only before the mind’s eye of intelligentsia and common people. The Congress leaders did, no doubt, stand by Mahatmaji’s call but in heart most of them did not like the total collapse of Britain. In fact, they do not think of India, independent of Britain. That the cruelties and hypocrisy of British imperialism far surpassed those inherent in fascism and Japanese imperialism were conveniently forgotten to meet Britain’s war needs and to divert people’s mind.

The Muslim League helped Britain. The Communist Party of India called the war as the people’s war and extended all help and co-operation to Britain not only in her war efforts but also in her organised machination to crush the revolutionary upsurge inherent in the Quit India Resolution’ and in the call for upsurge by the revolutionaries all over India. The Muslim League, Hindu Maha-sabha and the Communist Party of India got all help and assistance in crushing the Independence Movement. The industrialists, business men and traders and job seekers found in war great opportunities to enrich themselves. Educated men and women were reconciled with lucrative jobs. Mahatma Gandhi’s call for ‘Do or Die’ and the revolutionaries march to martyrdom were eloquently manifested by limited people only a band of patriots-albeit significant bat not overwhelming while compared with the total population and the cause involved. A sad contrast, indeed, when one witnessed the total response from the total people to the total mobilisation call by Netaji in East and South-East Asia, for the emancipation of motherland.

The Bengal famine–a man-made famine that was created to serve Britain’s imperialist’s need, took a toll during the period of 1943-44 of four million lives. With all the revolutionary tradition and spiritual and moral values that Bengal was proud of, not a single shot was fired against the criminals-nor a drop of tear was shed outside Bengal in the rest part of India. People died in front of sweetmeat shops, restaurants and hotels but the common man moved in and out, quite unconcerned and unmoved, as if the Quit India Resolution’ and the urge of revolutionaries concerned only the followers of the Mahatma and members of revolutionary parties. The people were not to blame-sandwitched as they were between two forces of indecision. The leaders and workers of the Congress took the ‘Quit India Resolution’, as symbolic and a moral injunction binding on them in India’s patriotic stand vis-a-vis Britain’s war efforts. In absence of a concerted programme for total struggle country wide for independence by striking the enemy its roots and branches, the people’s mind was at bay, bereft of a clear conscience. Again they lacked in that robust conviction that India’s strength and power if generated and directed point blank against the only enemy could match in defeating Britain that was strong and powerful and deeply consolidated in our soil, it would equally match in defeating all machinations of Japan or for that matter any other power, if and where faced, once India was free. Indecision seized the mind of the people during the most crucial period when India was in peril. Her resurgent soul should have remained unconquered and asserted to restore her glory.

Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose proved his mettle as patriot, a statesman and diplomat, during the crucial days of India’s destiny. The question of military operation in liberating the advance areas of Manipur State, Assam and Bengal, was most important from the view point of the Azad Hind Government and the Japanese military authority. The formation of an Indo-Japanese war co-operation council to conduct war operations on the soil of India was therefore considered a logical step. General Isoda, chief of the Hikari Kikan, proposed that a Japanese General be the chairman of the council. Netaji refused to consider the proposal. Japan continued on the insistence for a Japanese chairman of Netaji, equally refused to consider the proposal and insisted on an Indianchairman; in taking this stand he was as uncompromising as he was in his conviction to fight British imperialism. He would not compromise with anything that appeared to him as derogatory t the sovereignty of Free India. He would not concede to anything that would harm India’s honour and self-respect of Indian patriots at home.

Any student of history will be amazed at the stand taken by Netaji and at his patriotic fervour. On one side, the powerful Japanese Army that declared war against the two mightiest powers in the world Britain and America and reduced their power to ashes: On other side only three divisions of I.N.A. combatant forces. On one side, Japan occupying three fourths of the total area of Asia controlling the destiny of crores of people, on another side the Azad Hind Government functioning and that too on the territory occupied by Japan on the strength of only three million Indians, and that too scattered all over East and South-east Asia. On one side, Japan moved fifteen divisions from its Headquarters in Rangoon to Indo-Burma frontiers to march to India, on another side the Supreme command. I.N.A. deployed two divisions to face onslaughts of enemy and to liberate the north-eastern part of India, at the first outset. Japan’s involvement in operation was, therefore, gigantic and stupendous and her military strategy allowed no room for experiments. The main thrust against enemy’s position on the soil of India, especially in the north eastern zone was to be given by Japan’s mechanised army and air force till I.N.A. was prepared to meet the challenge. From the military point of view and in the context of Japan’s strength and involvement she insisted on a Japanese chairman in the council.

But Netaji would not yield. Soon after his arrival from Germany he sounded the Japanese High command on most vital issues and got assurance from Japan of all out unconditional aid towards India’s prosecution of war against Britain and he did not give any promise of military, economic or political concession to Japan in lieu of all her aid. And it was made emphatically clear when General Hideki Tojo, the Prime Minister of Japan declared, “The imperial Japanese Army will fight shoulder to shoulder withthe Indian National Army under the leadership of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, on Indian soil”. It was unequivocally clear.

When he met marshal Terauchi, the supreme commander of Japanese forces inland, air and sea, in East & South east Asia, Netaji made it clear that the main burden of liberating India through armed forces devolved on Indians and the Indian National Army and that any liberation of India secured through Japanese sacrifices was to him worse than slavery. The joint communiqué was issued to the effect that the I.N.A. soldier must form a spearhead of the advance into India and the Japanese soldier will advance as and when asked by the Commander of the Advance Headquarters of I.N.A. All Japanese commanders were informed accordingly. In his special order of the day issued soon after assuming the office of Supreme Commander of the Indian National Army on August 25, 1943, Netaji said that he deemed it to be against the national honour of India that the soldiers of I.N.A. should stay behind in battles of India’s independence, while the Japanese advanced into Indian territory. The first drop of blood to be shed on the sacred soil of India would be that of a soldier of the I.N.A.

Now when the declared policy of Japan not to interfere into the vital problems arising out of campaign on Indian soil was there Netaji did not budge an inch and insisted on an Indian chairman in the proposed Indo-Japanese War Co-operation Council. The Azad Hind Government, Netaji said declared war against Britain and America and the Indian National Army was fighting the battles of India on Indian soil, under the order of the Government and naturally an Indian general should be the chairman of the council and conduct the battles for India’s liberation with Japan as an ally. But General Isoda, chief of the Hikari Kikan (Liaison Department), Major General Yamamoto, Col. Kogawa and Col. Kitabe were adamant in insisting a Japanese chairman. It was only when Netaji threatened that he would then withdraw from the movement and in-form the Tokyo High Command and Marshal Terauchi that these officers of the Hikari Kikan came down and withdrew their suggestion for a Japanese chairman for the council. Netaji however, exercised tremendous self restraint during those crucial moments andnow took Japanese withdrawal of proposal with good grace and humour. The Japanese generals could see the mettle of a mat who stood unruffled as a pillar of India’s manhood not because of the enormity of men, money and materials at his disposal which was out of proportion while compared with those to be deploys at the mere bidding of the Japanese Military Authority but because of his inner faith in the soul of India and in her people in general and in the mettle of I.N.A. forces in particular.

Now the problem of the basis of co-operation and action between the Indian National Army and the Japanese Army in the campaign had to be solved. It was a gigantic task involving hundreds of thousands of armed man belonging to I.N.A. and t Japanese army to be deployed to take offensive along the whole Indo-Burma border. This was thoroughly discussed between the Supreme Command, I.N.A. and General Kawabe, the commander in chief of the Japanese army. It was decided that the operation would resume as soon as Netaji ordered them to advance. The following basic guidelines were decided upon:

1. A common strategy in the operation plan will be chalked out by the Commanders of the I.N.A. and Japanese Army Headquarters at Rangoon.
2. The I.N.A. and Japanese army are allies and will enjoy equal status in all respects.
3. The Command of I.N.A. forces and their units will remain in hands of I.N.A. Officers.
4. The smallest unit of I.N.A. forces will be a battalion under an I. N. A. officer. I.N.A. forces should not be split up in small groups. All I.N.A.s units will be composite units and will not be attached to any Japanese formations.
5. To maintain equal status of I.N.A. and Japanese army saluting was to be observed on a reciprocal basis. Junior officers of either army saluting the senior officer of the other army and officer of equal rank of both armies to salute at the same time. Bet
6. I.N.A. forces will be governed by I.N.A. Military Law and Army Act and the Japanese Headquarters will not be within its bounds to interfere in any way with its discipline and regulation. Total Mobilisation of men, money and materials on Indian soil will be conducted by the Provisional Government of Azad Hind.
7. Territories liberated in Indian soil must be handed over to the I.N.A. for administration under the over-all command of Major General Zamani Kiani the Divisional commander who will hand over the charge of administration of liberated areas to Major General A. C. Chatterjee, Governor designate of Liberated Areas and Leader of Azad Hind Dal.
8. Dumps of arms, ammunitions, oil, stores, equipment’s, machineries and all war materials seized by the Japanese army must be handed over to Provisional Government of Azad Hind.
9. Rule behaviour, looting and rape will not be tolerated. The Commander-in-chief of Japanese forces accepted and appreciated the order of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose to INA soldiers to shoot at sight any Indian or Japanese found in looting or raping on Indian soil. The Commander-in-chief, Burma Army, General Kawabe assured to issue similar orders to the Japanese Army.
10. The only flag that would be permitted to fly over liberated areas is the Indian Tri-colour the Indian National Flag.

In arriving at the solution of fundamentals Netaji had to work ceaselessly to get over the strong opposition from the Hikari Kikan-the Liaison Department of the Japanese High Command. Without budging an inch from the principle he over ruled the op-position of the General of the Hikari Kikan and his staff and directly negotiated with Marshal Terauchi, Marshal Sugiyama and General Kawabe the commander in chief of the Japanese Forces in Burma. On the question of equal status of I.N.A. with Japanese army the initial Japanese view point that the latter being the senior army should have higher status, was rejected by Netaji. So also the Japanese initial proposal on the question of officers holding the same rank in I.N.A. and Japanese army, that the Indian officers should salute first to Japanese officer, was vehemently opposed by Netaji.

On the Japanese proposal that small units or groups of I.N.A. soldiers be attached to larger Japanese formations, was not approved by Netaji for the simple reason that I.N.A. soldiers must remain under the command of I.N.A. officers only and also that I.N.A.’s solidarity should not be allowed to be disintegrated, On the question of military law and Army governing all combatant forces in East & South east Asia, General Kawabe at first proposed that the I.N.A. should be subject to Japanese military law just as all other allied armies, namely the Manchurian army, the China army, the Burmese army and the Thai army were subjected to. Netaji treated the proposal with contempt and eventually succeeded through negotiations with the Japanese High Command in asserting that all combatant forces of the Azad Hind Government would be subjected to I.N.A. military law and Army Act.

Netaji made it clear to the Japanese High Command that it was India’s war of Liberation and that the sacred burdens were to be shouldered by the Indian National Army. He was, therefore, continuously claiming that all war materials seized during the operation on Indian soil were the properties of the Azad Hind Government the Commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in Burma vehemently opposed the idea for military reasons. Netaji reminded that the Japanese army would fight shoulder to shoulder with I.N.A., for India’s independence which was the declared policy of Japan and not that the I.N.A. would fight shoulder to shoulder with Japan for the cause, Japan had to accede.

Regarding the governance of the Liberated Areas the Japanese High Command in Tokyo faced strong resentment from its combined armed forces in Burma on the Azad Hind Government’s decision and directive delegate power (a) to Major General Zaman Kiani to control combined armed forces – I.N.A. and Japanese on Indian soil and (b) to Major General A.C. Chatterjee, to govern liberated areas as the head of Civil administration. Netaji was determined. Japan had to agree.

So the image of a resurgent India appeared before us an India determined to wage war against British imperialism. A Free India was thus made conscious to shoulder the sacred burden all by her sons and daughters with confidence and adherence to fundamentals so that Japanese imperialism could not infiltrate.

No wonder, every soldier did his duty with faith in God and country and trust in the leader. And with that implicit faith the Indian National Army advanced through blood bath and liberated Moirang. The National Flag was hoisted on April 14, 1944 by Col. Malik and the Advance Headquarters of the Liberated Army was established at the residence of Shri H. Nilamani Singh at Moirang while the soil of Moirang and all its surrounding approaches was yet wet with the blood of Martyrs. The names of those national heroes should be entered in golden letters into the Galaxy of Martyrdom and the Historic site where the National Flag was hoisted should be declared as the First National Shrine of India standing ever as the Symbol of India’s Unity, Faith and Sacrifice.